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The guaranteed lending programs of the Small Business Administration (SBA) are large 
and growing rapidly. The SBA’s ﬁ  scal year 2008 performance budget calls for 
$25 billion in guaranteed loans for small businesses—a new record for the agency. Some 
critics of SBA programs suggest they do not help small businesses or overall economic 
performance. Other critics suggest that these programs unfairly beneﬁ  t the ﬁ  nancial 
institutions that participate in SBA’s guaranteed lending programs. While very little serious 
empirical evidence exists on whether the net economic impact of the SBA’s guaranteed 
lending programs is positive or negative, a few recent studies provide some insight into 
the question. In general, they suggest a small positive impact of the SBA’s programs on 
economic performance. However, the results are very tentative and further research is 
needed to declare a more deﬁ  nitive position. We provide a general overview of the SBA’s 
guaranteed lending programs and summarize the results of these studies.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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Introduction
Federal loan guarantees provided by the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) have 
grown markedly in recent years. During ﬁ  scal year 2006, the SBA guaranteed a record $18 
billion in loans for small businesses—a 43 percent increase over the $12.6 billion guar-
anteed for ﬁ  scal year 2003 (SBA 2007). Even more striking, the SBA expects to guarantee 
$25 billion for the ﬁ  scal year 2008, representing a two-year growth rate of about 30 per-
cent (SBA 2007).1 
SBA loan guarantees are aimed at a segment of small business borrowers that presumably 
would not otherwise have access to credit. But the increase in SBA guaranteed lending 
has occurred at a time when the beneﬁ  ts of SBA guarantees should be declining. Advanc-
es in computer and communications technology have substantially reduced information 
costs to the economy, and technological innovation has improved the informational efﬁ  -
ciency of credit markets—especially small business credit markets.
The recent growth of SBA loan guarantee programs, as well as their overall magni-
tude, raises questions as to whether there are demonstrable beneﬁ  ts to SBA activities and 
whether the beneﬁ  ts of the programs exceed their costs. Furthermore, because these 
programs represent society’s decision to subsidize credit to promote small business in 
the United States, we should ask whether government loan guarantees are the best way to 
do this from a social welfare standpoint. To answer that question, we must know whether 
the subsidies are delivering their social beneﬁ  ts at the lowest social cost. 
De Rugy (2007) argues that SBA guaranteed lending programs do not help small busi-
nesses or improve economic performance in the areas that receive these loans. She claims 
that SBA programs merely provide large subsidies for the ﬁ  nancial institutions that partici-
pate in SBA’s guaranteed lending programs. 
It should be possible to empirically test for any signs of differential economic perfor-
mance across local geographic markets based on the amount of SBA guaranteed loans 
ﬂ  owing into those markets. SBA loan guarantee programs have been in existence for a 
substantial period of time, and they vary signiﬁ  cantly in the amount of lending they chan-
nel into different geographic areas.  
There are a few recent studies that do just that.  They test for the impact of SBA 
guaranteed lending on economic performance, and they generally ﬁ  nd a positive one.   
However, they also observe that their ﬁ  ndings do not provide conclusive evidence that 
SBA guaranteed lending increases economic welfare.  After all, SBA guaranteed lending 
programs provide subsidies either to lenders or borrowers or both, and we know that 
subsidies are not free.  Someone must explicitly pay for them, and there may also be an 
implicit welfare cost.
We review these studies here and discuss their implications for public policy. We begin 
by sketching the economics of small business credit markets and the underlying eco-
1.  The $25 billion projected loan 
guarantees by the SBA in 
2007—while large from the 
standpoint of SBA activi-
ties—historically represents a 
small share of the small 
business lending market, less 
than 10 percent of estimated 
small business loan originations 
by banks, thrifts, and other 
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nomic mechanisms that might allow a directed subsidy such as SBA guaranteed lending 
to result in better observed economic performance before turning to the net welfare ef-
fect of SBA-administered subsidies.  
Small Business Credit Markets
Lenders may fail to allocate loans efﬁ  ciently because of information problems in the mar-
ket for small business loans. For example, lenders may not be able to obtain reliable infor-
mation concerning a potential borrower’s ability to repay a loan. Information problems 
may be so severe that they lead to credit rationing and constitute a credit market failure. 
In Stiglitz and Weiss’s (1981) classic analysis of credit market equilibrium in the presence 
of information frictions, banks consider both the interest rate they will receive on a loan 
and its riskiness when deciding to lend. However, in the presence of imperfect informa-
tion, banks face two information effects that may cause the riskiness of the bank’s loan 
portfolio to be affected by the bank’s choice of a lending rate; this in turn, makes it un-
likely that a rate will emerge that suits both the available buyers and sellers (that is, no 
interest rate will “clear the market”). One information effect, adverse selection, impedes 
the ability of markets to allocate credit using just the lending rate because it increases 
the proportion of high-risk borrowers in the pool of prospective borrowers. The other 
information effect, moral hazard, reduces the ability of rates alone to clear lending mar-
kets because once loan is extended the actions of borrowers is not independent of the 
lending rate. 
Adverse selection is a consequence of an environment in which lenders can only 
observe the risk characteristics of a pool of borrowers but not those of any individual 
borrower. The inability of lenders to determine the risk characteristics of an individual 
borrower would not be a problem if loan applicants were drawn randomly from the 
borrower pool. In such a case, banks could post a loan rate that the reﬂ  ected the risk of 
the average potential borrower. The bank could make a large number of small loans to 
borrowers in the pool, and the bank’s loan portfolio would have the same risk and return 
characteristics as the pool of borrowers. Unfortunately, the willingness of a borrower to 
pay any posted lending rate is not independent of his risk. Borrowers who are willing to 
pay a higher interest rate are likely to be, on average, worse risks, since they are likely will-
ing to borrow at a higher interest rate because they perceive their probability of repaying 
the loan to be lower. So, as the interest rate rises, the average “riskiness” of those who are 
willing to borrow increases—the adverse selection effect—and this may actually result in 
lowering the bank’s expected proﬁ  ts from lending. 
Moral hazard arises because the price a ﬁ  rm pays for credit can affect its investment 
decisions. Higher interest rates may induce ﬁ  rms to undertake riskier projects—projects 
with lower probabilities of success but higher payoffs when successful. Leveraged bor-
rowers have more incentives to undertake risky projects than unleveraged ones. Simply FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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raising the lending rate to account for lending-induced changes in ﬁ  rm risk-taking can 
be counterproductive, because a higher lending rate decreases the payoffs of successful 
projects to the ﬁ  rm. 
As a result of adverse selection and moral hazard, a bank’s expected return may in-
crease less than proportionately with an additional increase in the interest rate, and be-
yond a certain point, may actually decrease as the interest rate increases. Clearly, it is 
conceivable that the demand for credit may exceed its supply in equilibrium. Although 
traditional analysis would argue that in the presence of an excess demand for credit, un-
satisﬁ  ed borrowers would offer to pay a higher interest rate to the bank, bidding up the 
interest rate until demand equals supply, it does not happen if market imperfections lead 
to adverse selection and moral hazard. This is because the bank will not lend to someone 
who offers to pay the higher interest rate, as this borrower is likely to be a worse risk 
than the average current borrower. The expected return on a loan to a borrower at the 
higher interest rate may be actually lower than the expected return on loans the bank is 
currently making. In such an environment, there are no market forces leading supply to 
equal demand, and credit is rationed.
Lending Relationships as a Partial Antidote to Credit Rationing
Lending relationships have been recognized by economists as an important market mech-
anism for reducing credit rationing.2 Lending is based on limited information on the qual-
ity of borrowers in the market, but a close and continued interaction between a ﬁ  rm and 
a bank may provide a lender with sufﬁ  cient information about, and a voice in, the ﬁ  rm’s 
affairs so as to lower the cost and increase the availability of credit. Conditional on its 
positive past experience with the borrower, the bank may expect future loans to be less 
risky, which should reduce its average cost of lending and increase its willingness to pro-
vide funds.
The relationship-lending literature suggests that in addition to being formed over time, 
relationships can be built through interaction over multiple products. That is, borrow-
ers may obtain more than just loans from a bank. Borrowers may purchase a variety of 
ﬁ  nancial services such as checking and savings accounts. These added dimensions of a 
relationship can affect the ﬁ  rm’s borrowing cost in two ways. First, they increase the pre-
cision of the lender’s information about the borrower. For example, the lender can learn 
about the ﬁ  rm’s sales by monitoring the cash ﬂ  owing through its checking account or by 
factoring in the ﬁ  rm’s accounts receivable. Second, the lender can spread any ﬁ  xed costs 
of monitoring the ﬁ  rm over multiple products. 
Overall, the available evidence indicates that the strength and duration of lending re-
lationships are signiﬁ  cantly correlated with both the terms (lower loan rates and fewer 
loan covenants) and the availability of credit. From the perspective of the banks, the 
2.   See, for example, Kane and 
Malkiel (1965), Petersen and 
Rajan (1994), Berger and 
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stronger the relationship, the more likely the borrower is to select the bank for future 
credit needs and other banking services. 
The Potential Role for SBA Loan Guarantees
Ensuring access to credit has been an important pillar of public support for small busi-
ness in the United States for more than half a century.3 Concerns that small ﬁ  rms may 
face problems in getting access to funding may be valid, as a large share of small ﬁ  rms 
are relatively young and have little or no credit history. Lenders may be reluctant to fund 
small ﬁ  rms, especially those with new and innovative products, which are likely difﬁ  cult 
to evaluate. If small businesses face severe credit rationing, they may become credit con-
strained and miss out on projects that have a positive net present value because they can-
not raise the external capital necessary to fund them. This possibility suggests that to the 
extent credit rationing signiﬁ  cantly affects small business credit markets, a rationale ex-
ists for supporting small enterprises through government programs aimed at improving 
their access to credit. 
How Can SBA Loan Guarantees Reduce Credit Rationing?
Loan guarantees are one mechanism that can be used to mitigate credit rationing by pro-
viding a mechanism for pricing loans that is independent of borrower behavior. By re-
ducing the expected loss if the borrower defaults on the loan, the guarantee increases 
the lender’s expected return—without increasing the lending rate. With the guarantee in 
place, lenders could proﬁ  tably extend credit at loan rates below what would be dictated 
by the risk of the average borrower. Hence, loan guarantees lessen the adverse selection 
problem, as the lower interest rate increases the share of loan applications from lower-
risk borrowers, increasing the likelihood that the risk characteristics of the bank’s loan 
portfolio increasingly approximate that of the borrowing pool. Moreover, the guarantee 
increases the proﬁ  tability of the loan by reducing the losses to the bank in those instanc-
es when the borrower defaults. 
To the extent that the loan guarantees reduce the rate of interest at which banks are 
willing to lend, external loan guarantees will also help mitigate the moral hazard prob-
lem. This is because the lower lending rates afforded by external guarantees reduce the 
bankruptcy threshold and thereby increase the expected return of safe projects vis-à-vis 
riskier ones. 
Thus, in theory, SBA loan guarantees should reduce the probability that a viable small 
business is credit rationed. And because the program reduces the risk to the lender of 
establishing a relationship with informationally opaque small business borrowers, it may 
also increase the prospect of relationship-based loans in the future. Finally, the SBA loan 
guarantee programs may improve the intermediation process by lowering the risk to the 
3.  Public support for small enter-
prise appears to be based on 
the widely held perception that 
the small business sector is an 
incubator of economic growth—a 
place where innovation takes 
place and new ideas become 
economically viable business 
enterprises. In addition, policy-
makers routinely point to small 
businesses as important sources 
of employment growth. Possibly 
as a result, there is widespread 
political support for government 
programs, tax breaks, and other 
subsidies aimed at encouraging 
the growth and development 
of small business in the United 
States, and increasingly, around 
the world (Bergström, 2000).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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lender of extending longer-term loans, ones that more closely meet the needs of small 
businesses for capital investment. 
It is interesting to note that small-ﬁ  rm credit markets are becoming better at address-
ing some of the problems SBA guarantees are intended to address. For example, cred-
it-scoring technology may help alleviate some credit rationing. As discussed in Berger 
and Frame (2006), small-business credit scoring is a lending technology used by many 
ﬁ  nancial institutions over the last decade to evaluate applicants for “micro credits,” those 
under $250,000. The credit-scoring technology analyzes consumer data about the owner 
of the ﬁ  rm and combines it with relatively limited data about the ﬁ  rm itself using statisti-
cal methods to predict future credit performance. As these markets develop and more 
ﬁ  nancial institutions engage in these lending technologies, the degree to which small 
businesses face credit rationing may decline, which suggests that the value of SBA guaran-
teed lending may decline as well; at least to the extent that small-business credit scoring 
reduces frictions in the small-ﬁ  rm credit market.4 
One should not jump to the conclusion that the presence of a market imperfection, in 
this case a credit market friction, means that government intervention to correct it is de-
sirable. The SBA’s loan guarantee programs, for example, selectively inﬂ  uence credit allo-
cation by guaranteeing the loans of a certain class of small enterprises. From Kane (1977) 
and Craig and Thomson (2003), we know that selective credit allocation is likely to be 
an inefﬁ  cient and possibly counterproductive policy tool. In the case of ﬁ  nancial institu-
tions, the provision of subsidies tied to small-enterprise lending is likely to have costly 
unintended effects. The welfare costs of these unintended consequences may include 
deadweight losses associated with resource misallocation, wealth redistribution, and the 
possible reduced stability of the banking system. In the case of small businesses, the 
provision of subsidies tied to borrowing is likely to increase the amount of debt capital 
held by small ﬁ  rms and produce any resultant welfare costs associated with this differing 
capital structure. The subsidy associated with SBA guaranteed lending may have redis-
tributional effects that are inconsistent with conventional notions of social welfare. For 
example, it is likely that most of the wealth transfer will go to established small business 
owners or to the shareholders of the lending institutions, neither of which represents the 
poorest or most disadvantaged groups in our society.5
Nonetheless, the net value of subsidizing small businesses will be positive if the ben-
eﬁ  ts are greater than the costs. One of these beneﬁ  ts may be an increase in local market 
employment rates. This employment increase may have signiﬁ  cant social beneﬁ  ts, espe-
cially in areas with chronic levels of low employment.
SBA Loan Guarantee Programs and Local Economic Performance
The Small Business Administration was born on July 30, 1953. The SBA received most of 
its powers from two agencies that were dissolved at its birth. These agencies were the 
4.  For more on credit scoring as a 
lending technology see: Berger 
and Frame (2006); Berger, 
Frame, and Miller (2005); Frame 
and Woolsey (2001); Frame, 
Padhi, and Woolsey (2004).
5.  See Craig and Thomson (2003) for 
more on this point.POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 22, AUGUST 2007
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Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) and the Small Defense Plants Agency (SDPA). 
The SBA received the authority to make direct loans and guarantee bank loans to small 
businesses from the RFC. It was also assigned the RFC’s role of making loans to victims of 
natural disasters. From the SDPA, the SBA received the authority to help small businesses 
procure government contracts and to help small business owners by providing manage-
rial, technical, and businesses training assistance. 
Recognizing that private ﬁ  nancial institutions are typically better than government 
agencies at deciding on which small business loans to underwrite, the SBA began moving 
away from making direct loans and toward guaranteeing private loans in the mid-1980s. 
Currently, the SBA makes direct loans only under very special circumstances. Guaranteed 
lending through the SBA’s 7(a) guaranteed loan program and the 504 loan program are 
the main form of SBA activity in lending markets.
The more basic and more signiﬁ  cant of these two programs is the 7(a) loan program. 
The program’s name refers to Section 7(a) of the Small Business Act, which authorizes 
the agency to provide business loans to small businesses. All 7(a) loans are provided by 
commercial lenders. A very large percentage of American commercial banks participate 
in the 7(a) program, as do a number of ﬁ  nance companies, credit card banks, and other 
nonbank lenders. 
It is important to note that 7(a) loans are made available only on a guarantee basis. 
This means that they are provided by lenders who choose to structure their own loans in 
accordance with SBA’s underwriting requirements and then apply for and receive a guar-
antee from the SBA on a portion of the loan. The SBA does not guarantee the full amount 
of a 7(a) loan but rather usually about 50 to 85 percent of it. The maximum 7(a) loan is 
$2,000,000 and the maximum guarantee on that loan is $1,500,000 (SBA 2007). Because 
the SBA guarantees only part of the full amount of these loans, the lender and the SBA 
share the risk that a borrower will not repay them in full. 
The 504 loan program is a long-term ﬁ  nancing tool for economic development within 
a community. The 504 program provides growing businesses with long-term, ﬁ  xed-rate ﬁ  -
nancing for major ﬁ  xed assets, such as land or buildings, through a certiﬁ  ed development 
company (CDC). A CDC is a nonproﬁ  t corporation set up to contribute to the economic 
development of its community. CDCs work with the SBA and private-sector lenders to 
provide ﬁ  nancing to small businesses. There are about 270 CDCs nationwide. Each CDC 
covers a speciﬁ  c geographic area (SBA 2007). 
Typically, a 504 project includes a loan from a private-sector lender, which covers up 
to 50 percent of the project cost, a loan from the CDC (backed by a 100 percent SBA-
guaranteed debenture) covering up to 40 percent of the cost, and a contribution of at 
least 10 percent equity from the small business being helped. The SBA-backed loan from 
the CDC is usually subordinate to the private loan, which has the effect of insulating the FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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private lender from loss in the event of default. (For more on the 504 or 7(a) programs 
see SBA, 2007.) 
If SBA loan guarantees reduce credit rationing in the markets for small business loans, 
there should be a relationship between measures of SBA guaranteed lending activities and 
economic performance. We are thinking here primarily in terms of credit market frictions 
in the form of costly information acquisition and project veriﬁ  cation, which can lead to 
lower levels of credit allocation that negatively impact economic performance in the lo-
cal market.6  To the extent that SBA’s guaranteed lending program mitigates such credit 
market frictions, there should be a positive relationship between the amount of SBA guar-
anteed lending and economic performance, especially across local markets where credit 
market frictions are likely to be a signiﬁ  cant problem.7
Recent Empirical Literature 
Does more SBA guaranteed lending lead to higher levels of local market economic per-
formance? A search of the economic literature since 1990 on this question found only 
three papers—two of those by the authors of this article—that attempt to address it. We 
review those papers here. 
The results from Craig, Jackson, and Thomson (2007b) suggest that the answer to our 
question is yes; SBA guaranteed lending does lead to higher levels of local market eco-
nomic performance. In that paper we empirically test whether SBA guaranteed lending 
has a greater impact on economic performance in low-income markets. This hypothesis 
is predicated on priors related to four overlapping assumptions. These four assumptions 
are: (1) income levels proxy for relative development of the local ﬁ  nancial markets, (2) 
less developed ﬁ  nancial markets are more likely to have more severe information asym-
metry problems, and thus are more likely to be impeded by credit rationing problems (Sti-
glitz and Weiss, 1981), (3) SBA guaranteed lending is likely to reduce these credit rationing 
problems—thus, improving the level of development of that local ﬁ  nancial market, and 
(4) increased ﬁ  nancial development helps to lubricate the wheels of economic perfor-
mance (Rajan and Zingales, 1998).
Using local labor market employment rates as our measure of economic performance, 
we ﬁ  nd evidence consistent with this proposition. In particular, we ﬁ  nd a positive and 
signiﬁ  cant correlation between the average annual level of employment in a local market 
and the level of SBA guaranteed lending in that local market. And the intensity of this 
correlation is relatively larger in low-income markets. Indeed, one interpretation of our 
results is that this correlation is positive and signiﬁ  cant only in low-income markets. 
In Craig, Jackson, and Thomson (2007a) we report regression results that are consis-
tent with the hypothesis that SBA guaranteed lending produces positive, albeit small, net 
social beneﬁ  ts. Speciﬁ  cally, we report consistent evidence that the level of SBA-guaran-
teed lending activity (per $1000 of deposits) is positively related to the growth of per 
6.  An implicit assumption here is that 
labor and capital are comple-
ments...at least for small ﬁ  rms.
7.  This empirical relationship is 
also supported by the economics 
literature that documents a 
signiﬁ  cant positive correlation 
between economic growth and 
ﬁ  nancial market development. 
This literature dates at least 
to the controversial studies of 
Schumpeter (1911) and Robinson 
(1952). More recent important 
studies that provide evidence that 
relatively higher levels of ﬁ  nancial 
market development tend to 
lead to higher levels of economic 
performance include King and 
Levine (1993a, 1993b), Jayaratne 
and Strahan (1996), Rajan and 
Zingales (1998), and Guiso, 
Sapienza, and Zingales (2004). POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 22, AUGUST 2007
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capita income at the local market level—for both urban and rural markets. The impact of 
SBA-guaranteed lending on growth appears to be small. However, this small measurable 
economic impact of SBA loan guarantees on local economic growth would be expected 
given the limited role they play in the overall (small and large ﬁ  rm) credit intermediation 
process. 
In Craig, Jackson, and Thomson (2007a), our sample consists of local economic mar-
kets for which we have complete SBA guaranteed lending data over the sample estima-
tion period (1992 through 2001). Our sample contained more than 360,000 SBA loans 
aggregated to the local market level for each year in our sample. We estimated our models 
separately for urban and rural markets (that is, MSA and non-MSA counties, respectively). 
We used the instrumental variables (with the instruments from prior periods) and mean-
transformed data in our estimation procedures. 
The results from both Craig, Jackson, and Thomson (2007a) and Craig, Jackson, and 
Thomson (2007b) should be interpreted with caution, however, for at least two reasons. 
First, we are unable to control for small-business lending at the local market level, so 
we do not know whether SBA 7(a) loan guarantees are contributing to economic per-
formance by helping to complete the market for small ﬁ  rm credit or whether they are 
simply proxying for small business lending in the market. Second, we are not able to test 
whether SBA loan guarantees materially increase the volume of small business lending 
in a market—a question that is related to who captures the subsidy associated with SBA 
loan guarantees. In other words, simply ﬁ  nding a positive correlation between measures 
of SBA guarantees and local economic performance is only the ﬁ  rst step towards estab-
lishing the desirability of these programs. More evidence is needed to establish that SBA 
guaranteed lending programs are welfare enhancing.
Rappaport and Wyatt (1990) investigate the effects of bank characteristics and market 
demographics on bank participation in SBA lending. They ﬁ  nd that banks that participate 
more intensively in SBA lending concentrate more on business lending, are more likely 
to be members of a holding company, and may substitute SBA loans for consumer loans 
secured by personal assets in markets with populations of 50,000 or less. They also ﬁ  nd 
that in local markets with a population of 50,000 or less, greater SBA lending is associated 
with lower per capita income levels. They surmise that this correlation may be because 
the SBA has achieved its economic development policy objective, which is to focus more 
on low-income rural market areas.
The Performance of SBA-Guaranteed Loans
Glennon and Nigro (2005) examine the loan performance of small ﬁ  rms receiving SBA-
guaranteed loans. They place the performance history of SBA loans into perspective by 
comparing their default experience to that of rated corporate bonds. They ﬁ  nd that the FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
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historical cumulative default rates of SBA-guaranteed loans fall between the Ba/BB and B 
rated corporate-bond grades as reported by Moody’s and S&P. Although as a group, SBA 
loans are below investment grade, this historical behavior places them in the upper end 
of the speculative grade category and of similar credit quality as a large percentage of 
loans held by large commercial banks.
Unlike previous research, Glennon and Nigro ﬁ  nd that the hazard of default for SBA 
loans is conditional on several key borrower, lender, and loan characteristics. More speciﬁ  -
cally, they ﬁ  nd that loans to new businesses have a greater hazard of default than estab-
lished ﬁ  rms. They also ﬁ  nd, surprisingly, that larger SBA-qualiﬁ  ed ﬁ  rms (measured by the 
number of employees at time of loan origination) experience a greater hazard of default 
than smaller ones. 
As might be expected, they ﬁ  nd that SBA-specialized lender programs (i.e., certiﬁ  ed 
lender program and preferred lenders program) have lower hazard rates than the SBA’s 
regular lender programs. They also ﬁ  nd that loans with higher guarantee percentages are 
associated with a greater hazard of default. This result is consistent with agency theory, 
which would explain that lenders with less at stake on a loan have less incentive to moni-
tor that loan. The SBA has been addressing this issue by lowering the maximum guarantee 
percentage over the past decade. 
Finally, Glennon and Nigro also identify an important link between both regional and 
industry economic conditions and the likelihood of loan default. Similar to previous re-
search on other loan types, they ﬁ  nd that the success and failure of small-business loans 
are closely tied to the regional and industry-speciﬁ  c economic conditions in which the 
borrower operates.
Conclusion
The SBA’s guaranteed lending programs are large and growing rapidly. Some suggest these 
programs are useless for helping small businesses or improving economic performance 
in the areas that receive these loans. Others insist the programs are needed to provide 
support to small businesses, which often face difﬁ  culties ﬁ  nding sufﬁ  cient borrowing op-
portunities. 
However, very little serious empirical evidence exists on whether the net economic 
impact of SBA’s guaranteed lending programs is positive or negative. A few recent studies 
provide some insight for considering this question. In general, they provide evidence con-
sistent with a likely small positive impact of SBA’s guaranteed lending programs on eco-
nomic performance. However, these results are very tentative and much more research 
is needed to declare a more deﬁ  nitive position. Nonetheless, it appears that the prepon-
derance of the evidence from the current economics literature neither provides a strong 
case against nor a strong case for continuing the SBA’s guaranteed lending programs. POLICY DISCUSSION PAPERS  NUMBER 22, AUGUST 2007
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